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Abstract 
This paper undertakes a quantitative analysis of substantial reforms to the system of 
higher education (HE) finance first announced in 2004 and then revised again in July 
2007. The reforms introduced deferred fees for HE, payable by graduates through the 
tax system in the form of income-contingent repayments on loans subsidised by the 
government.  Lifetime  earnings  that  have  been  simulated  by  the  authors  using 
innovative methods, are used to analyse the likely distributional consequences of the 
reforms for graduates. It is shown that graduates with low lifetime earnings will pay 
less for their HE than graduates higher up the lifetime earnings distribution compared 
to the system operating before the reforms. Taxpayers will bear substantial costs due 
to the interest rate and debt write-off subsidies. The extent to which the reforms are 
likely to shift the balance of funding for HE between the public and private sector is 
also  analysed,  as  well  as  the  likely  distributional  consequences  of  a  number  of 
variations to the system such as removing the interest subsidy from the loans.
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1. Introduction
The Higher  Education  Act  of  2004 introduced a  set  of  substantial  reforms to  the 
system of higher education (HE) finance in England. These reforms, which included 
an  increase  in  fees,  income-contingent  loans  (ICLs),  and means-tested  grants  and 
bursaries, were preceded by lengthy discussions on the relative merits of alternative 
funding systems.2 Among the desired elements of the reforms that emerged from this 
debate were (i) that a greater share of the costs of HE be borne by graduates, the main 
beneficiaries  of  HE  (ii)  that  the  system include  an  insurance  element  to  protect 
graduates  against  low  realised  returns  from  HE,  and  (iii)  that  universities  see 
increased funding per head. Further refinements to these reforms were announced in 
July 2007.3 The 2004 reforms came fully into operation in September 2006 and the 
latest refinements will apply to students starting from September 2008. 
This paper assesses the extent to which the new reforms are likely to realise the above 
aims.  We start  off  with an analysis  of the distributional effects  of the reforms by 
student parental income. This reveals that the poorest students gain the most from the 
reforms, due to generous maintenance grants and subsidies outweighing the total costs 
of entering university,  and that  students from relatively well  off  backgrounds will 
typically face higher net costs of HE.  As the amount that graduates pay for HE will 
depend on the amount and timing of their  lifetime earnings,  we then consider the 
distributional  effects  of  the  reforms  by  graduate  lifetime  earnings.  This  analysis 
makes use of a new set of simulated earnings profiles, developed in Dearden et al. 
(2006), that account for earnings mobility and spells out of work, explicitly capturing 
the notion that some graduates will experience better labour market outcomes than 
others. We find that relative to the system that was replaced, graduates with the lowest 
lifetime earnings can expect to see a reduction in the cost of HE, while higher earning 
graduates will contribute more to the cost of their HE. In this way, we find that the HE 
reforms do in fact include a substantial insurance component. We conclude by taking 
a look at how the reforms affect university funding and how they shift the balance of 
2 For an overview of the key elements in this debate see Barr and Crawford (2005) and Chapman 
(2005).
3 See John Denham’s statement to the House of Commons on 5 July 2007, 
http://www.dti.gov.uk/science/page40318.html.
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funding  for  HE  between  the  public  sector  and  the  private  sector.  We  find  that 
universities  gain  financially  from  the  reforms,  both  through  additional  taxpayer 
funding and contributions from graduates. 
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways. First, it analyses 
quantitatively a HE funding policy that is  complex and multi-faceted.  There are a 
number  of  existing  studies  on  the  empirical  effects  of  HE policies,  contained for 
example  in  Keane and Wolpin  (1997),  Heckman,  Lochner  and Taber  (1998),  Lee 
(2001),  and  Gallipoli,  Meghir  and  Violante  (2006).  However,  the  overriding 
contribution  of  these  papers  is  in  analysing  HE policies  within  partial  or  general 
equilibrium  frameworks,  and  in  so  doing  they  consider  straightforward  HE 
interventions, such as tuition subsidies.  Whilst we do not use a structural framework, 
we add to  this  (largely US literature)  by considering the  quantitative effects  of  a 
relatively more complex set of HE reforms. 
Second, our paper adds important empirical evidence to the literature that emphasises 
the potentially valuable role of education policies with insurance elements, such as 
income-contingent loans. The concept of an ICL as a means to fund human capital 
investment  dates  back  to  Friedman  (1955).  Since  then,  numerous  works  such  as 
Nerlove (1975), Barr (1993), Greenaway and Haynes (2003), and Chapman (2005) 
have discussed their potential usefulness as a source of funding for HE. Our work 
adds empirical evidence on the likely distributional effects of such policies to this 
literature.  Moreover,  there  is  a  large  literature  on the  background to the  new HE 
reforms in England, a comprehensive summary of which is contained in Barr and 
Crawford (2005). However, this paper is the first to provide an in-depth analysis after 
the  reforms  have  been  implemented,  of  how  they  may  affect  different  graduates 
differently and of their implications for the public finances. 
Third,  at  the heart  of the reforms is the provision of built-in insurance against an 
inability to repay loans, thus giving central importance to the role of uncertainty in 
returns to human capital investments. Moreover, in analysing the distributional effects 
of  the  new  reforms  for  graduates,  we  implicitly  acknowledge  the  key  role  of 
heterogeneity in returns to higher education. This initially gained prominence through 
important  works  such as  Levhari  and Weiss  (1974),  Eaton and Rosen (1980) and 
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Kodde (1986).  There  is  more recent  work on the  design  of  an optimal  education 
finance system in the presence of uncertainty over the benefits of education, such as 
by De Fraja (2002), Benabou (2002) and Fernandez and Rogerson (1995), though the 
exact link between theoretically optimal systems and ICLs in practice is an area of 
open research. Our work adds empirical evidence to this largely theoretical debate.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the HE reforms. In section 
3 we consider how lifetime payments of HE depend on parental income, and set out 
the distributional implications of the reforms along this dimension. Section 4 assesses 
the distributional effects of the reforms on graduates according to graduate lifetime 
earnings, and sets out the likely distributional consequences of a number of potential 
future reforms, including increasing the fee cap and reducing loan subsidies. Section 5 
shows how the new system of HE funding alters the balance of funding between 
graduates, students, universities, and taxpayers. Section 6 concludes.
2. The 2004 reforms
The recent reforms to the funding of HE in England originated with the Department 
for Education and Skills’ White Paper published in January 2003, which set out plans 
for increasing fees for higher education, together with full fee deferral and the re-
introduction of means-tested grants for student support. The full reforms, somewhat 
altered since the publication of the White Paper, came into effect in England in 2006. 
Further  changes  to  the  system were announced in 2007,  mainly affecting  upfront 
support for students, which will affect students starting university from 2008-09.4 In 
this paper we analyse this most up-to-date HE funding system (for ease of notation we 
refer to it as the “new system”). One of the key motivations for the reforms was to 
reverse  the  long-term decline  in  funding per  head for  university  teaching seen in 
England over a number of decades, by increasing graduate contributions.
Compared to the system it replaced (referred to for convenience as the “old system”), 
maximum fees are higher – with fees variable, up to a £3,000 cap, which will remain 
4 See John Denham’s statement to the House of Commons on 5 July 2007, 
http://www.dti.gov.uk/science/page40318.html
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in place at least until 2010.5 In addition, there are no longer any exemptions for fees 
based on family income (see Table 1). Instead of being payable up front, all fees are 
now deferrable until after graduation, with loans available at a zero real interest rate, 
repayable according to income (at 9% above a threshold of £15,000). New grants are 
available for many students (up to £2,700 for the poorest students, tapered to zero at 
parental income of £60,000) and bursaries are now received by the poorest students 
(at  least £300 for the full fee). Further details are set  out in Dearden et al (2005, 
2007).
Table . An outline of the old system and new HE funding system for England
The “old” system The “new” system
Students would pay £1,200 in 2006-07a From 2006-07 students pay £3,000
- Up-front fee - Deferred fee
  (subsidised loans: zero real 
interest, 25 yr debt write-off)
- Flat fee rate - Variable fee rate
-  Exemptions  based  on   family 
income
- No exemptions
- Pre 2004-05, no grant -  Up  to   £2,700  in  grants,  plus 
additional bursaries
a In 2005-06 the fee is £1,175, and in the absence of reform this is up-rated in line with inflation each year.
For more detail, see Dearden et. al. (2005).
Sources: Department for Education and Skills,  The Future of Higher Education, Cm. 5735, 2003;  The Higher 
Education Bill, Bill 35, 2004;  The Future of Higher Education and the Higher Education Act 2004: Regulatory  
Impact Assessment,  2004;  Moving toward a Single Combined Grant for Higher Education,  2004; DIUS Press 
Release Increased Support for Students in Higher Education, 2007.
3. Distributional effects of the reforms: by parental income 
Much concern has been expressed about the equity, or distributional consequences of 
the new fee regime. In this section we consider the distributional consequences in one 
particular dimension, namely how individuals are affected according to their parents’ 
income. By looking at how payments balance out across the lifetime, we show that 
relatively less well off students are more than compensated for the increases in fees by 
large additions to up-front support in the form of maintenance grants and subsidies. 
For students from richer backgrounds, the total additional costs of entering university 
5 The system against which changes are measured, is the system in place in 2003-04, which was the  
final  year  before any of the new reforms, first  set  out  in the 2003 White Paper,  had begun to be 
implemented.  Note also that all figures throughout the paper are expressed in 2006 prices.
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under the new regime outweigh the total additional payments made to them through 
the student support system.6  
The net financial  improvement per year to a student from switching from the old 
system (the system in place in 2003-04) to entering under the new system (the system 
in place from 2008-09) is illustrated in Figure . The calculations underlying this figure 
assume that a student takes out the maximum student loans7, receives the average loan 
subsidy through the course of their working life8, and incurs the maximum fee. To 
provide a better idea of how the figures were derived, Table 2 shows the underlying 
calculations  for  a  student  on  family incomes  of  <£22,500,  £25,000,  £45,000 and 
>£60,000 respectively. 
Clearly the effects vary considerably across the parental income distribution.  Despite 
the higher fees and the loss of fee remissions, students with family incomes below 
around £46,000 should be better off under the new system. This is because they gain 
in grants, bursaries, and loan subsidies by more than the additional fees they will be 
required to pay. As we will show when we look at the distributional consequences of 
the system of loan repayments, this advantage under the new system would be higher 
if they go on to be low earners later in life. It can also be seen from Figure  that for 
those with family income above £46,000 per year, the additional costs to entering HE 
outweighs any additional benefits in the form of direct financial  support from the 
state.
6 Note however that this needs to be balanced against the fact that the removal of up-front tuition fees  
might remove some immediate liquidity constraints of students. Moreover, changes in quality might 
arise  from  the  increased  funding  for  universities.  However,  we  do  not  consider  the  potential 
improvement in education quality arising from the introduction of top-up fees as an additional benefit  
that  students  take  into  account  when making  their  education  decisions.  If  the  reforms lead  to  an  
increase in funding per  head however then this should, all  other things being equal,  increase both 
quality and thereby demand (i.e. improve the incentive to attend). 
7 Given the zero real interest rate it makes sense for all students to borrow the maximum available to 
them. 
8 Based on DfES projections, the average maintenance loan subsidy will be 21%, and the average fee 
loan  subsidy  will  be  33%.  Source:  Hansard,  10  November  2005,  Education  Finance, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldhansrd/vo051110/text/51110-25.htm.  If  lifetime 
earnings are lower than the level that attracts the average loan subsidy, then the subsidy will be higher.
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Table . The change in net financial position due to moving to the new funding 
regime by parental income. £ p.a.
Family income
<£22,500 £25,000 £45,000 >£60,000
Old system
Costs of attending:
Fees 1200 1200 1200 1200
Payments for attending:
Fee Remissions 1200 943 0 0
Maintenance loan subsidy 905 905 678 678
Net position 905 648 -522 -522
New system 
Costs of attending:
Fees 3000 3000 3000 3000
Payments for attending:
Grant 2700 2700 755 0
Bursary 300 300 0 0
Maintenance loan subsidy 676 676 773 767
Fee loan subsidy 990 990 990 990
Net position 1667 1667 -482 -1243
Overall  gain  from switching  systems 
(£p.a.) £762 £1019 £40 -£722
Figure . Change in net financial position in moving to the new funding regime, by 
parental income.
Note illustration is for student in first or second year living away from home outside 
of London.  The spike in the figure between £22,500 and £25,000 reflects the new 
entitlement to the full grant and the removal of partial upfront fees (see also Table 2). 
Source: Goodman (2005).  Author’s calculations, updated using DfES, LOAN, 
GRANT AND FEE RATES FOR ACADEMIC YEAR 2006/07 MEMORANDUM 1: 
SUPPORT AVAILABLE UNDER THE STUDENT SUPPORT REGULATIONS and 
DIUS Press Release Increased Support for Students in Higher Education, July 2007. 
See Table 2 for selected calculations by family income.
4. Distributional effects of the reforms: by graduate lifetime earnings
5.
In  this  section,  we  consider  how  the  new  reforms  affect  different  individuals, 
depending on where they end up in the lifetime earnings distribution as graduates. We 
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also consider the likely effects of some variants of the new system. For this analysis,  
we use new lifetime earnings simulations of graduates, set out in Dearden et al (2006), 
and  summarised  in  the  Appendix,  to  estimate  the  repayment  profiles  of  different 
graduates for any given level of debt, as well as the likely per-student cost to the 
taxpayer of fee deferral. These simulations provide us with estimates of the future 
distribution  of  graduate  earnings,  on  the  assumption  that  the  present  observed 
structure of earnings dynamics amongst graduates continues into the future, and that 
in addition to any simulated change in earnings due to age or experience, earnings 
increase by 2% in real terms each year due to underlying future productivity growth in 
the  economy.9 The  simulations  represent  one  of  the  only  published  empirical 
characterisations of the distribution of lifetime earnings for graduates in the UK. The 
only other work that we are aware of that attempted a similar exercise for the UK is 
that of Barr et. al. (1995), who developed a dynamic cohort microsimulation model 
based on one year of cross-sectional earnings data, to investigate the potential effects 
of different ICL schemes. In contrast to their work, we use panel data to account for 
dependence in earnings across time and movements into and out of the work force. 
This allows us to characterise more realistically the distribution of earnings.
i. Lifetime earnings simulations
This section provides a very brief summary of our methods for simulating lifetime 
earnings  (a  more  detailed  description  is  contained in  the  Appendix).  The lifetime 
earnings distributions are constructed using functions known as copulas,  the name 
being a reference to the fact that they ‘couple together’ k univariate distributions to 
form a k-variate distribution. In our case, the construction of k-variate distributions is 
simplified by assuming that wages follow a first-order Markov process, meaning that 
only the most recent draw of wages affects the distribution of the next draw. This 
allows us to model the dynamics of earnings over the lifecycle from just two wage 
9 This is in accordance with HM Treasury, who use this as the rate of long-term earnings growth.  
Please note that our previous simulations in working versions of this paper, and others, did not allow 
for this economy wide real earnings growth, making our simulations of the effects of policy rather 
different: in particular by simulating lower absolute levels of earnings going forward, we in general 
projected a greater cost to the taxpayer in loan subsidies, and a lower cost to the individual; the length  
of time we simulated that it would take graduates to repay their loans was also generally considerably 
longer than with our current earnings simulations.
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observations for the same individual.10  In practice, the way in which this is done is 
that within cells defined on the basis of age, gender and whether or not the individual 
is a graduate11, each individuals’ two observed wage levels are converted to ranks or 
relative positions,  and the parameters  of  the copula function that  best  capture the 
dynamics  of  these  ranks  between  the  two  periods  are  estimated  using  Maximum 
Likelihood methods. This leads to a sequence of bivariate distributions across ages 
spanning the  working lifecycle  for  each  gender/education  group.12 These  are  then 
pieced  together  to  form the  group-specific  overall  lifetime  earnings  distributions. 
Finally, we simulate a series of ranks from these joint probability distributions and 
map on the observed wage levels corresponding to these ranks to form earnings paths. 
One appealing feature of this approach is that the copula function allows us to model 
the dependence in wages between ages, thus characterising the observed dynamics in 
earnings (up to the first-order Markov assumption).13 But another important feature of 
the earnings paths is that in simulating them, we allow for a stochastic component to 
employment  and  assign  earnings  accordingly.  In  particular,  if  an  individual  is 
unemployed in a particular period, (s)he is assigned zero earnings; if (s)he becomes 
employed, his/her earnings are allowed to depend on the length of time unemployed, 
and his/her wage when last employed. Not only does this generate realistic mobility 
patterns  in  earnings  and  employments,  but  the  cross-sectional  distributions  of 
simulated earnings at each age, match those in the data.
Earnings simulations  are  based on data from the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
covering  the  period  spanning  1993  through  2003.14 The  LFS  is  a  representative 
10 A relaxation of first-order Markov to second-order Markov would come at a considerable technical 
cost  and  would  not  enable  us  to  use  the  LFS  data  which  only has  a  maximum of  two  earnings  
observations per individual.
11 A graduate is  defined as  an individual  holding a Higher Education qualification. This includes  
qualifications  that  constitute  Levels  4  and  5  under  the  Qualifications  and  Curriculum Authority’s 
original National Qualifications Framework: doctorates, masters degrees, postgraduate certificates and 
diplomas, bachelors  degrees,  graduate certificates  and diplomas,  diplomas of  higher education and 
further education, foundation degrees, higher national diplomas.
12 We model the evolution of wages from ages 22(19) through 60 for graduates (non-graduates).
13 Note that the benefits from allowing for earnings mobility in this way accrue from examining the 
entire distribution of lifetime earnings paths. If we were to focus on the effects of the policy on an 
example  “average”  graduate  then  it  would  not  be  necessary to  model  the  extent  of  intertemporal 
dependence in earnings.
14 In Dearden et al (2006), we have used the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) to estimate the 
earnings models. This is because the analysis carried out in that paper relies on a panel of longer than 
two  years,  so  the  relatively  large  sample  sizes  afforded  by  the  LFS  were  traded  off  against  this 
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household survey made up of a five quarter rotating panel. Prior to 1997, data on 
earnings were collected in the fifth quarter, and from 1997 onwards, data on earnings 
were also collected in the first quarter. To estimate the dependence in earnings for 
graduates, we restrict the sample to graduates aged 19 through 60 who are full- or 
part-time employees or in government employment or training programmes, and for 
whom we observe two positive earnings observations, which leaves us with a sample 
of just under 35,000 graduates.15 Note that the earnings simulations are drawn from all 
available years of LFS data, and for these we use graduates for whom we observe at 
least  one earnings  observation,  which  leaves  us  with  a  total  of  just  over  135,000 
earnings observations. The simulated employment paths and re-entry earnings ranks 
are  based  on  mobility  patterns  observed  in  the  British  Household  Panel  Survey 
(BHPS) between 1991 and 2004, inclusive. 
Figure  provides a picture of the simulated lifetime earnings distribution for graduate 
men and women.16 The median values for lifetime earnings (between ages 22 to 60) 
for men is simulated to be £2 million between the ages of 22 to 60, while for women 
the median simulated lifetime earnings is around £1.3 million. One important feature 
of these distributions to note is that they are much less skewed compared to more 
commonly observed cross-sectional distributions of wages. This is because taking into 
account mobility in individual earnings ranks over time reduces the level of inequality 
considerably.
Figure . Simulated lifetime earnings distributions for men and women
(approximately 60,000 households are interviewed each quarter in the LFS, compared to around 5,500 
households recruited in wave 1 of the BHPS). It is worth noting however that our simulations of the  
lifetime earnings distributions from both data sources are very similar. 
15 This means that we drop employees who did not provide data on earnings in both quarters, whether 
due to attrition from the survey (around 40% of our sample of graduate employees leave the sample  
between waves 1 and 5) or refusal to answer earnings-related questions (in general this ranges between 
10 and 20 per cent). Note that we nonetheless retain large samples to estimate dependence in earnings. 
It is difficult to know the extent of the biases, if any, induced by sample selection, and a full analysis of  
this is beyond the scope of this paper. 
16 In this figure, lifetime earnings are simply added across ages 22-60, without any discounting.
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Figure  shows the simulated median annual earnings at each age for male and female 
graduates. It shows that median annual earnings are simulated to rise from around 
£12,000 for men  and women at age 22 to a peak of around £73,000 (£47,000) for 
men (women) at age 56 (55). It must be remembered that these simulated earnings 
values are considerably higher than the median values observed in today’s distribution 
of  graduates  (where  the  median  male  graduate  annual  earnings  across  the  22-60 
population  is  around £30,000 and the median  female  graduate earnings  is  around 
£21,00017). This is because we are simulating future earnings for a graduate cohort 
starting undergraduate university in 2008-09, building in 2% real  earnings growth 
each year,  over  40 years,  in  addition  to  any increment  to  earnings  due to  age  or 
experience.
Figure . Simulated median earnings for men and women, ages 22-60
It is worth emphasising that our earnings simulations are not predictions of the future, 
they are instead simulations based on a series of assumptions. Predicting the earnings 
17 Source: Spring 2005 Quarterly Labour Force Survey.
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of  future  graduates  poses  more  severe  challenges,  in  particular  because  the 
distribution  of  earnings  of  future  graduates  is  likely  to  itself  be  affected  by  the 
reforms. This is for a number of reasons. First, the reforms may affect the decision to 
participate in HE, which may alter  the composition of students/graduates and thus 
earnings. Second, the reforms may affect choices at university, such as courses studied 
and the length of time spent at university, both of which may affect lifetime earnings. 
Finally,  the  reforms  may  have  general  equilibrium  effects,  for  example  through 
affecting  the  supply  of  graduates,  which  may  alter  the  relative  wages  of  future 
graduates. 
With this in mind, our analysis of the effects of HE funding policies on incomes do 
not represent forecasts or predictions of what we think the effects will be. Rather, they 
are an estimate of what the effects would be given our simulations of the distribution 
of  lifetime  earnings  of  graduates.  They  thus  serve  to  highlight  the  varying 
distributional impacts of different HE funding policies.
ii. The effects of different HE funding systems on graduates
Before we are in  a position to  make this  sort  of assessment  for  the new funding 
system, we need to consider how much students are likely to borrow under the new 
system. Although in practice there is likely to be less than 100% take-up of loans, in 
fact  it  makes  economic  sense  for  all  students  to  borrow  the  maximum  fee  and 
maintenance loans available to them. This statement holds regardless of what other 
sources of income are available, and is due to the large subsidy inherent in the zero 
real interest rate, and the possibility of debt write-off. For this reason we base our 
simulations on the full take-up of loans. 
This implies that students taking courses that charge the maximum fee of £3,000 per 
year will graduate with between £18,340 and £21,560 of debt for a 3 year course 
(£9,000 of  this  for  fees,  and the  remainder  for  maintenance),  varying by parental 
income due to slight variations in maintenance loan entitlements. This compares with 
£12,350 maximum subsidised loans - all for maintenance - under the system that has 
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been replaced. Some example maximum government debt levels under the old and 
new systems are shown in Table  at four different parental income levels.18
Table . Expected* levels of debt on graduation under the 2003-04 and new 
systems (at 4 example levels of parental income)
Year of HE entry:
Funding system:
2003–04 New 
system
Maximum 
government
External 
funding
Below £22,500 p.a. £12,350 £5,990 £18,340
Around £33,500 p.a. £12,350 £4,665 £18,340
Around £50,000 p.a. £9,265 £7,225 £20,285
Above £60,000 p.a. £9,265 £4,925 £19,590
*Expected debt levels show the amount students could borrow in government loans available under both systems, plus the 
private debt that would be required under the base system to reach the standard of living achievable through maintenance loans 
and grants under the new system. The figures relate to students living away from home outside London on a three-year course for 
which the maximum fee is charged. All amounts are expressed in 2006–07 prices.
The Table also shows “External funding”, which is that amount of non-government 
funding that students under the 2003-04 system would need in order to attain the same 
standard as living whilst in university as under the new system, whether by borrowing 
or other means. The higher availability of resources that can be put towards living 
expenses at  university under the new system is  mainly due to  the removal of the 
requirement to pay upfront fees and/or the introduction of grants.19   
For  all  of  the  subsequent  examples  we  assume  an  initial  debt  level  of  £18,340, 
representing the maximum amount of government loans available to those with family 
incomes below around £35,000. As the variation in maximum debt across parental 
incomes  is  relatively low compared to  the  size  of  the  overall  debt,  repeating  the 
forthcoming  analysis  over  different  maximum  debt  levels,  would  not  change 
inferences much.
18 There are currently no reliable data on what  percentages of students fall  into different income 
categories. Based on its 2006-07 data on grant take-up from the Student Loan Company (SLC) we can 
obtain some indication however. Around 23% of HE students receive the full grant (parental income 
below £17,500), 17.5% of HE students receive a partial grant (parental income below £33,500), and the 
remainder receive no grant.  However, a caveat is that around 20% of students do not apply to the SLC.
19 External funding is calculated as the difference between the upfront support for living expenses 
under the new and old systems. Under the old system, upfront support is equal to maintenance loans 
minus upfront fees. Under the new system, it is the sum of maintenance loans, grants and bursaries. 
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Note that to calculate net present values of debt repayments and the value of taxpayer 
subsidies,  we  assume  a  real  discount  rate  of  2.2%  per  year  (this  follows  the 
government’s present convention for discounting, see DfES, 2007).20 
We also assume that no graduates avail of the option to take a five-year holiday from 
loan repayments  (announced in July 2007).  Although it  would be in  the financial 
interest of all graduates to take this option (assuming the zero real interest rate on 
loans is maintained), it is difficult to predict when graduates would choose to take this 
holiday, and just how extensive it will be when it comes into force. However, it should 
be noted that we estimate that a graduate who takes it in the first five years of being 
eligible  for  repayments  stands  to  gain  an  additional  £850  in  subsidies  from  the 
government, regardless of their position in the lifetime earnings distribution. Further 
details are available from the authors on request.
a) Distributional effects of the new system
The first exercise we perform using our estimated graduate lifetime earnings profiles 
is to assess the net present value of debt repayments that graduates will be expected to 
make (i.e.  net of any subsidies they gain from the zero real interest rate and debt 
write-off), the number of years that graduates can be expected to repay their loans, 
and the taxpayer subsidy (expressed as a proportion of the original loan) that they can 
expect to receive under the new system. In all cases, we show how these outcomes 
vary across the distribution of graduate lifetime earnings.  
Figures  4a  though 4c,  and  Table   show the  combined  distributional  effect  of  the 
interest  subsidy  and  the  debt  write-off  provision.  Each  panel  shows  the  whole 
population of graduates, though this masks substantial heterogeneity across males and 
females,  which  are  also  shown.  For  a  given  level  of  debt  on  graduation,  lower 
lifetime-earning  graduates  will  eventually  repay  less  of  their  debt,  whilst  higher 
earners will repay more (Figure 4a and  Table  , column a). This is not a surprising 
20 Note that  our previous simulations in working versions of this paper,  and others,  used a 2.5% 
discount rate. By using a that higher discount rate, we in general projected a greater cost to the taxpayer 
in loan subsidies, and a lower cost to the individual than we do here; the length of time we simulated 
that  it  would take  graduates  to  repay their  loans  was  also  generally longer  than  with our  current  
earnings simulations.
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feature  of  the  income-contingent  loan  system,  given  its  design,  but  this  to  our 
knowledge represents the first empirical estimation of such distributional effects. 
Table . Average graduate payments under new HE system (debt of £18,340), by 
decile of graduate lifetime earnings distribution
Decile  of  
lifetime 
earnings 
distributio
n
a
NPV repayments,
£
b
Subsidy as
% of loan
c
Years to
repay loan
All Females Males All Females Males All Females Males
Poorest £9,077
£ 7,435
£13,43
0
50.5%
59.5% 26.8%
22.7 23.8 18.6
2nd £13,314  
£10,900
£14,64
0
27.4%
40.6% 20.2%
19.4 21.6 15.7
3rd £14,419
£13,180
£14,92
5
21.4%
28.1% 18.6%
17.2 19.9 14.4
4th £14,792
£14,225
£15,16
0
19.3%
22.4% 17.4%
15.4 17.9 13.3
5th £14,963
£14,645
£15,33
0
18.4%
20.1% 16.4%
14.4 16.4 12.5
6th £15,164
£14,850
£15,49
0
17.3%
19.0% 15.5%
13.4 15.3 11.7
7th £15,333
£14,980
£15,63
0
16.4%
18.3% 14.8%
12.6 14.5 11.1
8th £15,527
£15,185
£15,79
0
15.3%
17.2% 13.9%
11.7 13.4 10.4
9th £15,757
£15,340
£15,88
0
14.1%
16.4% 13.4%
10.6 12.6  9.9
Richest £16,004
£15,670
£16,10
5
2.7%
14.6% 12.2%
9.4 11.1  9.0
All £14,439 £13,640 £15,23
8
21.3%
25.6%
16.9
% 14.7
16.6 12.7
Figure a.  Net present value of graduate repayments under the new HE system
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By the same token, the value of the government subsidy (expressed as a proportion of 
the face value of the loan in Figure 4b and Table , column b) is strongly decreasing in 
income, ranging from around 60% for the lowest lifetime-earning women, to around 
15% for the highest earning women (with the average across all women at around 
25%). For men the range of taxpayer  subsidy is  narrower,  at  around 27% for the 
lowest earning men, and 12% for the highest earners (with the average subsidy at 
around 17%).
Figure 4b.  Subsidy as percentage of loan under the new HE system
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The  number  of  years  taken  to  repay  (Figure  4c  and  Table  ,  column  c)  is  also 
decreasing in lifetime earnings – ranging from 25 years for the lowest earners (at 
which point all outstanding debt will be written off), to between 10 to 15 years for the 
highest earners. For women the average time for repayment is around 17 years, whilst 
for men it is around 13 years. Around 21% of women can expect to have some debt 
written off, with their repayment capped at the 25 year cut-off, whilst this is the case 
only for around 2% of graduate men.  These results all highlight the fact that the 
longer the loan is held by a graduate, the bigger is the taxpayer contribution to the 
repayment of that loan. This of course runs counter to a commonly held notion that 
holding graduate debt for a long time is an indication of the “heavy burden” of that 
debt. 
Figure 4c. Years to repay loan under the new HE system
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Taken together, the analysis in Figures 4a-4c, illustrates the potential benefits of the 
new system in  terms  of  the  insurance  it  provides  against  low realised  returns  to 
investments in HE. This is seen most clearly though the dependence of the level of 
government subsidy on realised labour earnings later in life. Our results thus provide 
empirical  support  for  the  use  of  income-contingent  loans  as  a  mechanism  for 
providing  insurance  in  the  face  of  uncertain  and  heterogeneous  returns  to  human 
capital investments.
b) How does the new system compare to the old system?
An interesting question our simulations can address is how these patterns of graduate 
repayments and taxpayer subsidies compare to the previous HE funding system. In so 
doing, it highlights the distributional effects of various key aspects of the reforms. 
There are three important differences between the two systems that we will consider 
here. First, the new system has more generous loan subsidies. Second, it has higher 
levels of government debt on graduation. Third, the new system allows students to 
obtain a better standard of living at university, due to the availability of grants and/or 
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the removal of upfront fees, which reduces student reliance on external sources of 
funding such as bank loans. In this section we will analyse each of these three aspects.
Note however, that in making comparisons across the two HE funding systems it is 
important to emphasise that our analysis here is  partial: it focuses on the impact on 
graduates of the debt repayment element of these systems, but ignores how much 
graduates as taxpayers would have been expected to pay, in tax, to raise the required 
government revenue to finance these systems. We will return to this in Section 5. 
Figure  through Figure  set out the differences between the old and new systems along 
the above three dimensions. Each figure presents the distributional pattern of graduate 
debt repayments under the new system as compared to the system being replaced. Due 
to the substantial differences across males and females that are masked by considering 
the whole graduate population together, as seen in the previous section, from hereon 
we show all analyses separately by gender.
First we show the effects of the two new changes to the loan repayment conditions - 
the  provision  for  debt  write-off  after  25  years  and  the  raising  of  the  repayment 
threshold to £15,000. By comparing the two systems for a given level of debt (here 
fixed  at  the  new  system’s  maximum  level  of  £18,340),  Figure   shows  that  this 
combination of reforms is progressive across the distribution of graduate earnings – it 
reduces the amount that all graduates will have to repay, but reduces the amount for 
the  lowest  earning  graduates  the  most.  The  biggest  gains  clearly  arise  for 
approximately the poorest fifth of women, who repay an average of around £3,600 
less under the new system. These are the women who as we illustrated earlier, gain 
from debt write-off after 25 years.
Figure .  Distributional effects of new system compared to old system of HE 
funding: effects of reforms to loan system (raising of threshold to £15,000 and 
introduction of debt write-off after 25 years)
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Next we present the pattern of graduate repayments under the new system compared 
to the old system, taking into account that the level of debt on graduation will be 
considerably higher under the new system compared to the old system, due to the 
requirement  to  pay  higher  fees.  As  we  set  out  in  Table  3,  the  maximum  total 
maintenance loan after 3 years under the old system amounted to £12,350, compared 
to  the  counterpart  for  these  individuals  under  the  new  system  of  £18,340,  for 
maintenance and fees.  Of course these extra payments are offset to varying degrees 
by the reforms to the loan repayment system that we highlighted above. In Figure  we 
show  the  net  effects  of  the  increased  government  borrowing,  but  under  more 
favorable terms. The Figure shows that whilst most individuals will be required to pay 
considerably  more  in  debt  repayments  after  graduation  under  the  new  system 
compared to the old system, approximately the poorest tenth of women will actually 
make  smaller  total  debt  repayments  under  the  new  system (saving  up  to  around 
£2,700 in total) despite graduating with considerably more debt: as we have already 
seen this is largely due to the provision for debt write-off after 25 years. 
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Figure .  Distributional effects of new system compared to old system of HE 
funding: net effects of i) increased government debt,  ii) reforms to loan system
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Finally, we take into account the fact that under the new system, the requirement to 
take out private debt is likely to be reduced, because of the new up-front support in 
the form of grants and bursaries, and the removal of the requirement to pay any fees 
up-front.  As  we  discussed  above,  the  effects  of  these  changes  to  up-front  grant 
entitlements  and  fee  liabilities  differs  quite  markedly  according  to  parental 
background. Here we show the effects for individuals at the lower and upper ends of 
the parental income distribution: first the reduction in private debt required under the 
new system amounts to £5,990 over 3 years for those at the lower end, mainly due to 
the  new grants  and  bursaries;  second,  the  reduction  in  the  need  for  private  debt 
amounts to around £4,925 over 3 years for those at  the top end, mainly from the 
replacement of up-front fees with fees that are fully deferrable. In order to estimate 
the costs of such private debt, we assume fixed payments over 10 years at a 4% real 
rate of interest.21 As shown in Figure , once the effects of the removal of up-front fees 
21 Our assumption that all students would need to take on private debt to achieve the same standard of 
living under the old system as under the new system helps to simplify the exposition. In reality, many 
would obtain it from parents, or would take on part-time jobs instead, which have potentially quite 
different impacts on educational outcomes. 
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and the addition of grants and bursaries are taken into account, for all students from 
poor backgrounds, the total payments required on graduation will actually be  lower 
under the new system than under the old system. The opposite is the case for students 
from richer backgrounds,  the majority of whom would repay  more under the new 
system, with the exception of females from the bottom 20% of the graduate earnings 
distribution.
Figure .  Distributional effects of new system compared to old system of HE 
funding: net effects of i) increased government debt,  ii) reforms to loan system, 
and iii) reduction in requirement for private debts 
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So although graduates in general will be asked to contribute more to the costs of their 
education under the new system, the ones who as students were poorest will end up 
repaying less in loans than prior to the reforms. This is due to the combination of two 
factors: first, the fact that they would not have to borrow as much money privately 
under the new system, and second, the two changes to the loan repayment conditions 
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that are coming into force at the same time22 as fees are being increased – both a 
higher repayment threshold and debt write-off after 25 years.
Related to this point, one could argue that one of the biggest losers of the reforms may 
in fact turn out to be private banks, who in the past may have profited from extending 
commercial loans to students whose parents had not picked up the full costs of their 
HE (though see also footnote 20). As we have just seen, increases in up-front support 
from taxpayers will almost certainly reduce the need for recourse to such relatively 
expensive types of loan.
c) Possible reforms to the new system
Looking to the future, it is likely that the level and form of taxpayer subsidy inherent 
in the loans may come up for review in 2009, when the DfES reports to parliament on 
the effects  of the reforms. A number of suggestions have been made for reducing 
taxpayer costs, including the abolition of the zero real interest element of the subsidy 
– see Barr, 2004, and Astle, 2006. The reason given by proponents of this proposal is 
that, given the introduction of debt write-off after 25 years in 2006-07, the additional 
benefit from the interest subsidy actually goes to those who are not the lowest earners. 
Figure  illustrates this by showing how two variants - both of which restrict the value 
of the interest subsidy - compare to the new system of income-contingent loans to be 
introduced this  year.  Here we continue to  assume a level  of debt  of  £18,340 and 
compare the total value of debt repayments, the interest subsidy, and the total years 
taken to repay under each of three repayment schemes:
• New system: this is the system to be introduced in 2008-09 and described
already above.
• Variant 1: 2.5% real interest rate on debt: under this variant, the repayment
22 Though  strictly  speaking,  note  that  the  repayment  threshold  changed  one  year  before  the 
introduction of top-up fees, in 2005-06.
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of loans remains income-contingent, with debt write-off after 25 years, but the 
interest rate subsidy is effectively eliminated by the charging of interest of 2.5% 
pa above inflation on the debt.
• Variant 2: “NZ” system: under this variant, similar to the one currently in 
place in New Zealand, the repayment of loans also remains income-contingent, 
with debt write-off after 25 years, and the interest rate subsidy is eliminated by the 
charging  of  interest  of  2.5%  pa  above  inflation  on  the  debt.  However  when 
earnings are low, the income-contingent repayment amount may be too low to 
cover the interest element of the loan. In this case, the government would pay on 
behalf of the borrower the additional interest due, meaning that the outstanding 
balance on the loan would be prevented from spiralling during periods of low 
earnings.
Our calculations suggest that the removal of the interest subsidy (i.e. a switch from 
the new system to variant 1) would amount to the equivalent of the removal of an 
average up-front grant of around £2,465 for each female graduate and £2,880 for each 
male graduate (whilst the additional cost to the graduate of the “NZ system” relative 
to the new system would be around £1,940 and £2,280 respectively). 
However, as can be seen from Table , these savings for the exchequer, and costs to the 
graduate  would  be  highest  for  men  in  the  2nd to  4th deciles  of  the  male  lifetime 
earnings distribution, and for women at the 6th and 7th, deciles of the female earnings 
distribution.  The  very lowest  female  earners  would  lose  relatively  little  from the 
removal of the interest subsidy, since many are protected by the provision for debt 
write-off after 25 years.
Table . Average additional costs to graduates of removing interest subsidies, 
relative to new system, by decile of the lifetime earnings distribution 
Decile of 
lifetime 
earnings 
distributio
n
Variant 1, 
2.5% real interest
£ 
Variant 2, 
“NZ system”
£
Additional cost to graduate 
compared to new system
Additional cost to graduate 
compared to new system
F M F M
Poorest    £371  £2,924 £299 £2,118 
2nd   £1,016  £3,491  £819 £2,578 
3rd   £1,827  £3,390 £1,450 £2,539 
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4th   £2,616  £3,168 £2,078 £2,457 
5th   £3,210  £3,010 £2,469 £2,379 
6th   £3,419  £2,852 £2,575 £2,306 
7th   £3,356  £2,710 £2,557 £2,248 
8th   £3,156  £2,552 £2,463 £2,154 
9th   £2,999  £2,459 £2,411 £2,068 
Richest   £2,670  £2,234 £2,242 £1,931 
ALL £2,464 £2,879 1936 £2,278 
Figure . Comparing possible future reforms: removing interest subsidies
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Other  options  for  reducing  the  taxpayer  cost  of  graduate  loans  would  include 
extending the length of time after which the loans are written off beyond 25 years, or 
reducing the repayment threshold, for example by removing the default indexation 
provision after 2010, so that its real value erodes over time.23 It should be noted that 
23 The current system of up-rating the £15,000 threshold in line with inflation means that year on year 
the system becomes less progressive for relatively low earners. This is because the threshold increases 
at a relatively slower rate than earnings. So, each year fewer and fewer individuals have earnings below 
the threshold, and therefore the subsidies to these individuals are lower. Indeed, considering the effects 
of the reforms for graduates in 2009 rather than 2011, as in previous versions of this paper, we see that  
the system is less  progressive for  the 2011 cohort  of  graduates  for  this  reason.  This  is  unlike the 
situation in Australia for example, weher the threshold is set relative to average earnings to ensure  
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both of these options would affect low lifetime earners more than the withdrawal of 
the interest subsidy.
Another alternative, and a potentially revenue-saving reform to the loan system from 
the point of view of the Exchequer, could be to offer students the choice of a discount 
on their fee if they pay up front. For example in Australia, until 2005, students had the 
option of paying the fee upfront at the beginning of each academic term, at a 20% 
discount.24 According to our calculations, just over one half of women and 77% of 
men  would  benefit  financially  from  this  option.25 These  are  individuals  whose 
earnings  are  sufficiently  high  that  they  would  not  gain  much  from  the  fee  loan 
subsidies.  This  means  that  a  substantial  proportion  of  people  would  lose  out 
financially if they were to go for the discount option, and only those students who 
have information to suggest that they will fall into a relatively high earning category 
should consider  taking the discount.26 Note also that risk averse students (or their 
parents)  who might  prefer  to  pay off  a  fixed  sum while  studying  could  lose  out 
financially from this decision.
Finally,  it  is  worth  considering  what  the  additional  costs  to  the  graduate  and 
exchequer might be if the fee cap, currently imposed at £3,000 per year, were lifted to 
£5,000.  Figure  shows that of the extra £6,000 in fees over a three year degree that 
such a lifting of the cap would imply (i.e. an additional £2,000 per year above the 
current £3,000 cap), a very substantial proportion would in fact be covered by the 
taxpayer  rather  than  by  graduates,  because  of  fee  deferral.  On  average,  female 
graduates would have to contribute £3,300 extra in total towards the increased fees (or 
55% of the fee increase), and male graduates would have to contribute around £4,400 
(73% of the fee increase), but the amount payable would be strongly increasing in 
progressivity of the system remains.
24 This was reduced from 25% in 2005, and note that the proportion of eligible students choosing to 
pay upfront was just over 20% in 2002.
25 These figures are calculated by comparing the net present value of total fee and maintenance loan 
repayments, with the sum of the discounted value (at 80%) of upfront fees and the net present value of 
maintenance loan repayments.
26 Note that the levels of uncertainty in future earnings and employment, which are at the core of this 
paper, would render this an extremely difficult decision for the student.
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lifetime earnings. Notice that the taxpayer subsidy for additional fee increases are 
greater than the average subsidies calculated for the full £18,340 loan (Table 4), since 
the income contingent system combined with the zero real interest rate means that 
each additional £1 borrowed comes at a greater cost to government and smaller cost to 
the borrower. Clearly any increase in the fee cap would boost universities’ income, 
but at the same time would put considerable upward pressure on public expenditure, 
unless the system of loan subsidies were reformed.
Figure . Taxpayer and graduate contributions to a rise in the fee cap from £3,000 
to £5,000
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Note:  Figure  shows  median  payment  by  decile  group  of  lifetime  earnings 
distribution.
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6. The shifting balance of funding
7.
8. Whilst the analyses of the previous sections have highlighted the 
distributional effects of the new system for students and graduates, in this 
section we take each of these groups as a whole, as well as taxpayers and 
universities, and consider how they are affected financially by the reforms. In so 
doing, we show how the reforms shift the balance of funding for HE between the 
public and private sector.
9.
We illustrate  who pays  for  the  system of  HE funding in  England by means of  a 
circular  flow of  payments.  Table   sets  out  our  calculations  of  the  net  balance  of 
payments  (-ve  on  the  table)  and  receipts  (+ve  on  the  table)  between  different 
participants within the HE system - universities, students, graduates and taxpayers - 
under the old and new systems of HE funding in England. Accounting for both where 
payments come from and where they go to results in a zero-sum. Comparing such 
zero-sums across different systems gives us a clear indication of the net winners and 
losers (or less emotively, payers and receivers) from the new reforms.27 Note,  these 
figures are mainly based on official government public expenditure projections from 
2005.
Looking at the first column of the table, we see that under the old system, universities 
received about £5.5bn in total funding for teaching, coming mainly from taxpayers 
(via direct payments to universities in the form of the recurrent teaching grant made to 
HEFCE  each  year,  and  fee  exemptions),  and  also  students  (via  up-front  fees). 
Graduates also gained around £0.6bn, from maintenance loan subsidies (paid for by 
taxpayers). The second column shows that under the new system university coffers 
are significantly swelled, to around £6.7bn.28 This increase is paid for by graduates, 
27 Of course, in reality the distinction between these different groups is more blurry than our analysis 
suggests: for example, students go on to become graduates, so transfers between these two groups are 
really  transfers  across  time,  rather  than  between  people.  Most  graduates,  and  some  students,  are 
taxpayers. Money paid to universities will in general benefit the students who attend them and the  
graduates they go on to become.
28 This amount has not been reduced by potential payments of new bursaries to 
students with parental income between £17.5k and £25k. We currently assume that 
1/3 of students receive bursaries.
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through  deferred  fees  (subsidised  by  taxpayers).  Students  become  net  recipients, 
receiving around £1.1bn in total from new grants and subsidies. 
Table . Circular flows of payments: old and new systems, £billions
OLD
2003-04 system
NEW
2008-09 system
New system 
compared to old 
system
Taxpayers -£5.6 -£6.7 -£1.1
Students -£0.5 £1.1 £1.6
Graduates £0.6 -£1.1 -£1.7
Universities £5.5 £6.7 £1.3
Sums of gains and losses £0 £0 £0
Notes: Totals may not sum due to rounding. For simplicity, student gains calculated here include gains from the  
introduction of maintenance grants compared to the 2003–04 system (transfers from taxpayers), but do not include 
changes to maintenance loans (which might  be thought  of as transfers  from graduates to  students).  Bursaries 
assumed to be minimum mandated (£300).
Source: Authors’ calculations outlined in Dearden et.al. (2005),  and updated based on best information available 
as of 21st May 2007, using official public expenditure projections from 2005, Hansard Written Ministerial 
Statements for 10th November, 2005 (Column 22WS) and information on cost of extending student grants from 
2008-09, estimated by DIUS at £182 million. Note, cost of graduate repayment holiday, estimated by DIUS at £40 
million, not included.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo051110/wmstext/51110m01.htm#column_22, 
DfES Departmental Expenditure Report for 2007, and HEFCE grant letter from DfES 2007.
The  final  column  of  Table   shows  the  net  impact  of  all  these  changes.  First, 
universities’ net position improves by around £1.3 billion, from £5.5 billion under the 
old system to around £6.7 billion under the new system. On aggregate, this should 
make  a  significant  inroad  into  the  well-documented  shortfalls  of  the  university 
sector.29  Second, the overall taxpayer contribution to the costs of HE rises by around 
£1.1 billion compared with an unchanged 2003–04 system for  tuition and student 
support. Third, students are better off under the new system due to grants and fee 
deferral, by around £1.6 billion (note that voluntary bursaries from universities, likely 
to  amount  to  £300  million  in  total,  improve  students’ positions  further).  Finally, 
graduates contribute around £1.7 billion more,  through increases in fees, offset by 
new loan subsidies from the taxpayer. 
•
This analysis also highlights the changing balance of funding between the public and 
private sector as a whole as a result of the new reforms. Taking students and graduates 
together,  we  see  that  the  net  increase  in  contributions  from  these  two  groups 
29 See  for  example,  the  submission  from  Universities  UK  to  the  2004  Spending  Review 
(http://bookshop.universitiesuk.ac.uk/downloads/SR2004.pdf)
29
combined amounts to the relatively small sum of £100m, whilst the net increase in 
contribution from the taxpayer amounts to around £1.1bn. This suggests that while the 
university sector as a whole is growing, the biggest net increase on aggregate is from 
the public not the private sector. However, if we consider tuition alone, it is certainly 
the case that the share of private contributions will be rising. This is illustrated in 
Figure .  Prior to the introduction of top-up fees in 2006-07, the private contribution to 
tuition costs, of around £5,000 per student per year, is 8%.30 With the new system in 
place, funding could increase to around £6,000, or by 24%31 on average in real terms 
per  head,  if  all  universities  charge  the  full  fee.  The  private  fee  contribution  will 
amount to around 33% of the total, though this will be substantially subsidised by the 
taxpayer in the form of loan subsidies, arising from the zero real interest rate on the 
new fee loans and the provision for debt write-off after 25 years. Taking into account 
the loan subsidy element of the fees, the private contribution will be around 23%.
Figure .  The balance between public and private costs of tuition 
8%
68%
9%
23%
92%
Note: Public funding excluding loan subsidies is reduced between 2005-06 and 2008-09 due to removal of fee  
exemptions. The public money currently spent on fee exemptions will of course partly pay for additional loan 
subsidies shown on this figure.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Department for Education and Skills Departmental Report, 2005 Table 12.7 
http://www.dfes.gov.uk/publications/deptreport2005/docs/2005deptrep.pdf,  and  National  Statistics  First  Release 
SLC SFR 01/2004 Table  2C http://www.slc.co.uk/pdf/slcsfr012004.pdf.  All  figures  up-rated to 2006-07 prices 
using GDP deflator.
The analysis in this section also suggests that some of the most important effects of 
the reforms will be distributional effects within the private sector, both over time (for 
example where there are shifts in costs from students to graduates), and, as we have 
30 Based on HEFCE recurrent grant for teaching in England (which covers undergraduate and post-
graduate teaching), plus public and private contributions to the basic fee, divided by the number of FTE 
equivalent  undergraduate  and post-graduate students.  Note that  these  funding per  head figures  are 
calculated on a different basis to those produced by the DfES and presented in its yearly departmental  
reports.
31  Based on DfES public expenditure estimates, projecting in total £2.25 billion in fee revenues each  
year in steady-state. This figure assumes that 91% of universities charge the full fee, and excludes only 
the minimum mandated bursary amount of £300 for the poorest students on courses where the full fee 
is charged. The Office for Fair Access has estimated around 91 per cent of HEIs and FECs are planning 
to charge the full tuition fee of £3,000, and that a “typical” bursary would be considerably more than  
the  minimum,  at  around  £1,000.  See  Press  Release  from  17  March  2005 
(www.offa.org.uk/news/2005/acc_agr.asp).
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seen already, between different types of individuals, for example by parental income, 
or by the level of lifetime earnings as graduates.
10. Conclusions
11.
This paper has shown that the reforms to HE funding in England which were first 
introduced in 2006 and which will fully come into place in 2008, will result in a 
significant increase in transfers from graduates and taxpayers, directed both towards 
the funding of universities, and student support. A closer inspection reveals a more 
nuanced picture than this, with a relatively small overall net increase from the private 
sector, but with important distributional consequences of the reforms. 
Individuals from the lowest part of the parental income distribution will typically find 
a substantial net reduction over their lifetime in the cost of their higher education, due 
to the new grants and bursaries. On the other hand, individuals whose parents come 
from the middle to high parts of the parental income distribution will typically end up 
seeing the costs of their higher education increased. 
Grouping people by where they end up in the lifetime graduate earnings distribution, 
rather than by their parental origin, another interesting picture emerges: women with 
the lowest lifetime earnings will again see a reduction in the cost of HE as a result of 
the reforms (so long as they defer all possible payments through the subsidised loans 
on offer), while higher earning graduates will indeed in general pay more of the cost 
of  their  own  HE  as  a  result  of  the  reforms.  Our  findings  suggest  that  income-
contingent nature of loans under the new system do provided some level of insurance 
against low realized returns from HE for graduates.
Looking to the future, any cost reductions achieved by the possible removal of the 
zero real interest subsidy would hit hardest those men in the 2nd – 4th lifetime earnings 
deciles, and women in the 6th and 7th earnings deciles. The lowest earners would in 
general be protected by such reforms, because of the provision for debt write-off. 
We  conclude  by  stressing  that  our  analysis  highlights  the  varying  distributional 
impacts of different HE funding policies. It does not represent a prediction of the 
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effects of the reforms, as the lifetime earnings distributions do not represent forecasts 
of  future  earnings  of  graduates.  Rather,  they  are  based  on  current  earnings  data. 
Estimating  the  distribution  of  earnings  of  future  graduates  poses  more  severe 
challenges,  particularly  as  this  distribution  is  likely  to  itself  be  affected  by  the 
reforms. This is for a number of reasons. First, the reforms may affect the decision to 
participate in HE, which may alter  the composition of students/graduates and thus 
earnings. Second, the reforms may have general equilibrium effects, through affecting 
the supply of graduates for example, which may alter the relative wages of future 
graduates. Third, the reforms may affect choices at university, such as courses studied 
and the length of time spent at university, both of which may affect lifetime earnings. 
We leave these important topics for future work to address.
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12. Appendix: Copula Model for Earnings Dynamics
The  approach  that  uses  copula  functions  is  relatively  new  to  the  literature  on 
modelling earnings dynamics32, and an outline of the methodology is provided here. 
Let  a  be  the  labor  market  experience  of  an  individual  and  let  X be  a  vector  of 
observed characteristics of the individual. We can write the logarithm of the observed 
wage, ya, of an individual as
\* MERGEFORMAT (.)
 where  is the conditional expectation. The aim is to estimate a statistical model for the 
distribution of the vector of residuals , where T is the total number of years spent in 
the labor force. We denote this conditional density , for a subset . In our application, 
the variables  contained in   include gender  and whether  or not  the individual  is  a 
graduate.
The curse of dimensionality renders a fully nonparametric estimator of  infeasible for 
large T. Rather than assume a multivariate normal distribution, our approach is to use 
Sklar's (1959) theorem to decompose  into a sequence of marginal densities and a 
copula density which completely describes the inter-temporal dependence structure in 
the vector w. We refer the reader to Nelsen (1999) and Joe (1997) for details on the 
definition of a copula and examples of parametric forms.
\* MERGEFORMAT (.)
If wages follow an n-order Markov process, the copula density may be written as
32 The exception to this is Bonhomme and Robin (2005). The use of copula functions is much more  
common in financial econometrics. See for example Patton (2006a,b).
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\* MERGEFORMAT (.)
Under the assumption that  is a first  order Markov process, the copula density in 
equation (1.3) can be decomposed into the product of a sequence of bivariate copula 
densities which describe the dependence structure between adjacent observations of 
wa
   \* MERGEFORMAT (.)
Since, under the first order Markov assumption, an observation will correspond to a 
vector of length two, , the log likelihood function for the sample is
\* MERGEFORMAT (.)
To estimate the model, we use the two-step pseudo-maximum likelihood procedure of 
Genest,  Ghoudi  and  Rivest  (1995).  We  first  estimate  the  sequence  of  marginal 
distribution functions using the re-scaled conditional empirical distributions, denoted 
below. We then replace the true distribution with the empirical one in the likelihood 
function and maximise the resulting function with respect to the copula parameters:
\* MERGEFORMAT (.)
This two-step semi-parametric approach has the advantage that inference about the 
copula parameters and copula model selection is  robust to misspecification of the 
marginal  distributions.  However,  it  is  not  efficient,  and  a  more  efficient  one-step 
estimator is provided in Chen, Fan and Tsyrennikov (2006). However, we favour the 
two-step approach mainly for reasons of computational efficiency.33
33 Note also that the two-step approach allows one the flexibility of using two different data sets to 
estimate marginal distributions and mobility. This feature is exploited in Dearden et al (2006), who use 
large samples of good quality cross-sectional earnings data to estimate the marginals.
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The parametric copula used in this paper is the t-copula, which outperformed all but 
one of the other parametric copulas we tested (model selection tests are presented in 
section Dearden et al, 2006). Its parameters are simple to interpret and it is relatively 
straightforward to estimate and simulate, making it considerably attractive
The t-topula is the dependence structure implicit in a bivariate t distribution.34 It has 
two parameters: the correlation parameter, ρ, and the degrees of freedom parameter, ν. 
These can be broadly interpreted as describing the overall level of immobility in the 
distribution and the excess immobility in the tails of the distribution. The function, 
describes the way in which we restrict the copula parameters to depend on experience 
and the observable characteristics. We assume the following functional forms:
\* MERGEFORMAT (.)
where  and  are monotonic functions designed to keep ρ and ν inside their respective 
ranges:
\* MERGEFORMAT (.)
34 For detailed information on the t-copula, including a formal definition, see Demarta and McNeil 
(2005).
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